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PUBLIC NEEDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS:
EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND




The field cultivated by the topic of condemnation is partic-
ularly productive. It is of importance to the practitioner who
is concerned with adequately representing his client. It is of
importance to the legislator who is responsible for determin-
ing public policy. Finally, it is important, in a more estoteric
manner, to the legal savant who is concerned with the many
problems, both legal and inter-disciplinary, arising from the
action. There exists in our contemporary American society an
ever increasing need for additional space and property devot-
ed to the purpose of the public interest. Urban settlement
areas are expanding, acquiring sizable acreage each year.
This is true also of service areas including rights-of-way of
railroads, highways, and roads, and airports. Parks, play-
grounds, and recreational areas are also rapidly increasing in
both number and size.'
The rapid increase of imperative public needs and the ac-
quistion of private property is not limited to the more urban
areas of our society. Within rural areas there is a rapidly in-
creasing spread of urban conveniences and services and re-
sulting land use condemnation which minimize urban-rural
distinctions. This phenomenon is particularly true in North
Dakota where 93.3 per cent of the total land area of the state
is in farm land. - Within the state there is an ever increasing
pattern of acquisition of property by various agencies of the
federal, state, and county governments. This property acquisi-
tion is a reflection of the growing necessity for conserving
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota; Director,
Agricultural Law Research Program.
Research Associate, Agricultural Law Research Program, School of
Law, class of 1962.
1. For discussion of these patterns of condemnation see Marschner,
Land Use and Its Patterns in the United States, Agriculture Handbook No.
153, United States Department of Agriculture (1958).
2. United States Census of Agriculture-North Dakota (1959), StHte
Table 1 at 3.
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water, soil, and other resources, for driving and parking space
to accomodate an annual increase in motor vehicles, for fed-
eral military defense reservations, and other diverse but im-
portant public needs.'
All of these public needs emphasize the need for increased
attention to the proper rule of the vaguely familiar power of
eminent domain. Condemnation is one means for dealing with
the various problems suggested. Its results are often drastic.
"The problems engendered by the endless effort to reconcile
imperative public needs with the preservation of private
rights are the special responsibility of lawyers in our sys-
tem."' The legal profession must be properly informed if it is
to perform its proper function in devising solutions for the
diverse problems arising from eminent domain and land con-
demnation. This is the hopeful intent of this article.
EMINENT DOMAIN
"Eminent Domain is an attribute of sovereignty. It is
as enduring and indestructible as the state itself. It exists
outside of the Constitution for no state can exist without
it."
5
Eminent domain traditionally is considered as superior to
all private rights.! It is exercised by the governmental auth-
ority for the common good and general welfare of all the citi-
zens. The right of eminent domain arises from the necessities
of government and is a necessary and inseparable part of the
government.'
While governmental power to acquire private property for
public use has existed since the Roman era,' the term used to
denote such power is of comparatively recent origin. The term
"dominium eninens" (eminent domain) seems to have been
originated in 1625 by Hugo Grotius who wrote of this power
in his work De Jure Belli et Pacis stating:
".... the property of subjects is under the eminent do-
main of the state, so that the state or he who acts for it
may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not
3. See Governor's Message to 37th Legislative Assembly, House Journal,
State of North Dakota (1961) at 31.
4. Kennedy, Forward-A Symposium, 43 Ia L. Rev 168 (1958).
5. JAHR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN at 3 (1953).
6. IT. S. v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of San Diego, 44 F. Supp. 936
(D.C., Cal. 1942).
7. Paine v. Savage, 126 Me. 121, 196 Atl. 664 (1927); Board of Regents
v. Palmer, 356 Mo. 946, 204 S.W.2d 291 (1947); New York Housing Authority
v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
8. ANNUALS OF TACITUS, Bk. 1 at 75.
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only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even pri-
vate persons have a right over the property of others,
but for ends of public utility, to which ends those who
founded civil society must be supposed to have intended
that private ends should give way. But it is to be added
that when this is done the state is bound to make good
the loss to those who lose their property.
While the authors of our constitution were familiar with
the definitions and discussions of the political writers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the phrase "eminent
domain" has been accepted in common use in this country
only a little more than a hundred years.
The taking of property by eminent domain is referred to
as condemnation, and the proceeding whereby the land is tak-
en is termed a condemnation proceeding. The state, its repre-
sentative, or the private corporation to whom the power of
eminent domain has been delegated is called the condemnor,
and the owner whose property is acquired is normally refer-
red to as the condemnee.
In North Dakota eminent domain is defined by statute as
.. the right to take private property for public use.' The
purpose of this study is to examine the rights of both the ac-
quiring agency and the property owner, and some of the prob-
lems therein, under law governing eminent domain in North
Dakota. Rather than speculating on what should be done, we
are attempting to present the conclusions of the courts in
North Dakota in this area.
There is an intelligible increase today of the right of emin-
ent domain. It is conspicuous in North Dakota since the crea-
tion of the Interstate Highway program, and the substantial
improvement of state roads, the relocation of airports, and
the augmentation of projects of reclamation on the conserva-
tion of natural resources. Because of the diversity of statu-
tory law among the jurisdictions both state and federal and
within the states themselves, at present there is no clearly
established uniform body of law within the United States
upon which to base decisions in condemnation proceedings. It
has been observed that:
"In those cases where there is no stare decisis to cast
9. Lib III, C. 20.
10. JARR, op. cit. supra, at 4, see also NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMIN-
ENT DOMAIN, Vol. 1 at 7 (1950).
11. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-01 (1961).
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its light or shadow, the courts must hammer out new
rules that will respect whatever values of the past have
survived the tests of reason and experience, and antici-
pate what contemporary values will best meet those
tests. The task is not easy-human relations are infinite-
ly complex, and subtlety and depth of spirit must enter
into their regulation. Often legal problems elude any
final solution, and the courts then do no more than find
what Cardoza called the least erroneous answers to in-
soluble problems."1
The legislature, even by a special enactment, cannot clothe
the property of an individual or a corporation with immunity
from subsequently authorized condemnation.
EMINENT DOMAIN IN NORTH DAKOTA
Any department, political subdivision or agency of the
state3 as well as a person, firm, or private corporation can1 '
take property through eminent domain in North Dakota. The
acquisition of the property must.be necessary for a public use.
An early North Dakota decision held that the legislature had
seen fit to take the question of necessity out of the power of
the condemnor, and had trusted the determination of this is-
sue to the judicial branch of government.' Although other
jurisdictions are contrary," the rule is still in existance as in-
dicated by recent decisions." It is true, however, that a great
deal of latitude is given to the acquiring agency vested with
the right to property by eminent domain in determining the
extent of property necessary to be taken.'
Power companies," railroads,' special school districts,' tele-
phone companies,' and the highway department,' among
12. SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL CENTER, PROCEEDINGS OF THIRD
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN at iv (1961).
13. N.D. Const. § 14.
14. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-01 (1961).
15. Bigelow v. Draper, 6 N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570 (1896).
16. City of Oakland v. U. S. 124 F.2d 959 (1942); Sibley v. Volusia Coun-
ty, 147 Fla. 302, 2 So. 2d 578 (1941); Reter v. Davenport, R.I.&N.W. Ry. Co.,
242 Ia. 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952).
17. Otter Tall Power Cpy. v. Malme, 92 N.W.2d 514 (N.D. 1958); Kessler
V. Thompson, 75 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 1956); Pembina Co. v. Nord, 78 N.D. 473,
49 N.W.2d 665 (1951).
18. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kreszeszewski, 17 N.D. 203, 115 N.W. 169
(1908).
19. Otter Tail Power Co. v. Malme, oupra note 17.
20. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kreszeszewski, supra, note 18.
21. Board of Education of City of Minot V. Park District, 70 N.W.2d 899
(N.D. 1955).
22. Northwestern Telephone Exch. Co. v. Anderson, 12 N.D. 585, 98 N.W.
706 (1904); Donovan v. Allert, 11 N.D. 289, 91 N.W. 441 (1902),
23. State Highway Commission v. State, 70 N.D. 673, 297 N.W. 194 (1941).
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numerous others have the right to condemn property in North
Dakota.
RIGHTS OF THE CONDEMNING AGENCY
The state and its political subdivisions, departments and
agencies, have a superior right over private property, stem-
ming from the state. The power of an individual, a firm or a
private corporation in North Dakota is a delegated power of
the state commissioned through the legislature.
The type of estate or aggregate of rights acquired by the
condemnor in North Dakota is governed by statute.' The
classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to con-
demnation are:
1. A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or
grounds, or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs, and
dams and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, or for
an outlet for a flow or a place for the deposit of debris or
tailings of a mine, or for the construction of parking lots
and facilities for motor vehicles;
2. An easement, when taken for highway purposes or
for any other use except, upon a proper allegation of the
need thereof, the court shall have the power to order that
a fee simple be taken for such other use;
3. The right of entry upon and occupation of lands and
the right to take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones,
trees, and timber as may be necessary for public use.
A 1960 North Dakota decision stated that eminent domain
statutes must be strictly construed.' Judge Strutz com-
mented:
"In eminent domain, therefore, that construction must
be adopted which leaves the owner with the greatest pos-
sible estate, in the event of uncertainty or indefiniteness
in the statute."
It would appear that the above quoted statutory provision
would be strictly construed against the condemning agency.
Generally, the condemning agency has unlimited rights in
the selection of the property to be condemned. The highway
commissioner may, when acting within his perogative in con-
demning property, secure material or the land necessary to
secure such material, which is necessary "to provide ways and
24. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-03 (1961).
25. Wallenstein v. Williams County, 101 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1960).
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access thereto . . ."' However, recent legislation has provided
that no condemning agency will acquire any interest in gas,
oil, or fluid minerals by the eminent domain procedure.'
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Right of eminent domain may be exercised when condemn-
ing property for any public use. In North Dakota, it is un-
necessary to prove the public necessity for the property con-
demned.' The only proper question that the court may decide,
is whether the particular property sought to be condemned is
necessary for such public use. Before property is taken, how-
ever, it must appear:
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use author-
ized by law;
2. That the taking is necessary to such use; and
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the pub-
lic use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public
use.'
RIGHT TO SURVEY BY CONDEMNING AGENCY
In all cases, when land is required for public use in North
Dakota, it may be surveyed and located.' The land of the pro-
perty owner is open to examinations and surveys, and maps,
if needed, may be made. A cause of action in favor of the land
owner will result only for injuries from negligence, wanto-
ness, or malice on the part of the condemning party.'
In North Dakota the condemning agency has a great deal
of latitude in selecting the site or location when necessity for
the exercise of power of eminent domain is proved or admit-
ted. 2 The court will not interfere if the selection of the prop-
erty has been in good faith and after careful consideration.'
THE CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING IN NORTH DAKOTA
Since the 19,56 Amendment to Section 14 of the Constitu-
26. N. D. Cent. Code § 24-01-18 (1961).
27. See the "oil, gas, or other fluid minerals" exception in N. D. Cent.
Code H4 24-01-18, 32-15-03.
28. City of Grafton v. St. Paul, 16 N.D. 313, 113 N.W. 598 (1907).
29. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-05 (1961).
30. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-06 (1961).
31. Ibid.
32. Northern States Po. Co. v. Effertz, 94 N.W.2d 288 (N.D. 1958).
33. Northern States Po. Co. v. Effertz, supra, note 33; Otter Tail Po. Co.
v. Maine, supra, note 16; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kreszeszewskis, supra,
note 17.
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tion of North Dakota,' condemnation procedure for the state
and its political subdivisions, agencies and departments is
comparatively simple. Most governmental departments use
the "quick take" procedure. This procedure is authorized by
Section 14 of the Constitution and Section 24-01-22.1 of the
North Dakota Century Code. The procedure as used is:
1. An offer by the acquiring agency to the property owner
to purchase the property in question.
2. Upon refusal of the offer, deposit of such offer with the
Clerk of the District Court in and for the county in which the
property is located.
3. Notice by the Clerk of the District Court to the property
owner of such deposit.
4. An appeal by the property owner to the District Court
within 30 days after receiving Notice from the Clerk.'
This procedure is examined in Koecks v. Cowell', a 1959
case, involving a condemnation proceeding by the Highway
Department. It has been stated regarding this "quick take"
procedure that:
"This procedure has been a tremendous benefit to the
Highway Department in its highway program. As can be
seen, it permits the highway program to go ahead with
construction work prior to the time when the actual trial
regarding the issue of just compensation is held."'
The method used by a private corporation, firm or an in-
dividual is quite similar, and is governed by Section 14 of the
Constitution of North Dakota and Chapter 32-15 of the North
34. The following was added to the original test:
"That when the state or any of its departments, agencies, or political sub-
divisions seeks to acquire right of way, It may take possession upon mak-
ing an offer to purchase and by depositing the amount of such offer with
the Clerk of the District Court wherein the right of way is located." Laws
of North Dakota, 1957, Ch. 397
Section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution now reads:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use .without
just compensation having first been made to, or paid into court for the
owner. No right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corpora-
tion until full compensation therefor be first made in money or ascer-
tained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit from
any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall
be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, provided however, that
when the state or any of its departments, agencies or political subdivis-
ions seeks to acquire that right of way, it may take possession upon mak-
ing an offer to purchase and by depositing the amount of such offer with
the clerk of the district court of the county wherein the right of way Is
located. The clerk shall immediately notify the owner of such deposit. The
owner may thereupon appeal to the court In the manner provided by law,
and may have a jury trial, unless a jury be waived, to determine the dam-
ages.
35. Letter from Mr. David L. Milhollan, Special Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, State of North Dakota, October 30, 1961.
36. Ruecks v. Cowell, 97 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1959).
37. supra, note 35.
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Dakota Century Code. Highway condemnation proceedings
are governed by Charter 24-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code.
When an offer by the condemnor is refused under Chapter
32-15, the condemning agency is required to draw a com-
plaint' which requires the name of the condemning agency,
name of the owner of the property, a statement of the right
of plaintiff, the location and general route of the right of way
together with a description of each piece of land sought to be
taken. The complaint need not allege that provisions for pay-
ment of award have been made.'
The amount of the offer is deposited with the Clerk of the
District Court,' who immediately notifies the property own-
er. Any person who claims an interest in the land may de-
fend."1 After the entry of final judgement by the court, the
plaintiff must, within 30 days pay the sum of money assessed,
unless the action involves condemned school or public land."
If the money is not deposited, the property owner may have
execution as in civil motions." When the property owner ac-
cepts the amount deposited by the condemnor, he abandons
all defenses interposed by him, except his claims for greater
compensation." If the property owner is dissatisfied with the
judgment, he may, of course, appeal.' While this is the gen-
eral condemnation procedure as prescribed by North Dakota
law, slight variations may exist from county to county.
RIGHTS OF THE PROPERTY OWNER
1. RIGHT TO APPEAL AND TRIAL.-Section 14 of the North
Dakota Constitution gives the property owner the right to
appeal after receiving the Notice of Deposit from the Clerk
of District Court, when the condemnor is the Highway De-
partment, the State, or one of its subdivisions. Section 24-01-
22.1 of the code, which has been held complete in itself," gives
the land owner thirty days in which to appeal, after receiving
the Notice. A 1961 North Dakota case held that notice from
the District Court to attorneys who had corresponded with
38. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-18 (1961).
39. City of Lidgerwood v. Michalek, 12 N.D. 348, 97 N.W. 541 (1903).
40. N. D. Const. § 14.
41. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-20 (1961).
42. N. D. Cent Code § 32-15-25 (1961).
43. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-20 (1961).
44. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-29 (1961).
45. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-34 (1961).
46. Kuecks v. Cowell, supra, note 36.
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the Highway Department was not sufficient." The Court inter-
preted the statute as providing that written notice of the de-
posit may not be given to anyone except the landowner.
A private person, firm, or corporation must file a com-
plaint'8 which is prescribed by law, if the property owner re-
fuses their offer. The issues arising may be tried at any term
of District Court in the county in which the property is locat-
ed." The condemnor must serve the property owner notice of
trial at least seven days in advance of the hearing. A motion
for a new trial and appeal from the decision of the trial court
is available to the property owner.'
2. RIGHT TO JURY-Under the laws of North Dakota, the is-
sue of compensation for private property taken or damaged
for public use must be tried to a jury, unless a jury is waived.
A 1951 case implies that both parties must waive the right,
and each party may individually demand a jury trial, if they
so desire."' All other issues are triable without a jury. Kessler
v. Thompson,' a highway condemnation case, refers to two
statutes in reference to appeal and trial by jury.' There is no
provision for a waiver. The second statute refers to the Dis-
trict Court, and declares that the issues shall be submitted to
a jury unless the parties otherwise agree." This infers that
both parties would have to agree to waive, and that each in-
dividually may demand the same.
Section 32-15-01 of the North Dakota Century Code states
that "compensation in all cases shall be ascertained by a jury,
unless a jury be waived." It does not say who may waive. Sec-
tion 32-15-13 is more distinct and proclaims that the plaintiff
may demand a jury trial.
These statutes taken collectively seem to infer that either
party to condemnation proceedings may demand a jury trial
to decide the issue of compensation.
3. RIGHT TO DAMAGES-Under North Dakota Law, the prop-
erty owner is entitled to a certain amount of damages when
land is condemned.' He is entitled to:
47. Cowl v. Wentz, 107 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1961).
48. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-18 (1961).
49. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-17 (1961).
50. N. D. Cent. Code §_ 32-15-34 (1961); see Northern States Power Co.
v. Teigen, 80 N.W.2d 110 (N. Dak. 1956).
51. Pembina County v. Nord, supra, note 17.
52. 75 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 1956).
53. N. D. Cent. Code § 24-07-25 (1961).
54. N. D. Cent. Code § 24-07-26 (1961).
55. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-22 (1961).
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1. The value of the property sought to be condemned. (All
Parcels are separately assessed.)
2. The damages which will accrue by reason of severance
of a part of a larger parcel.
3. The damages resulting from construction of the pro-
posed improvement, even though no part of the property is
taken.
Compensation should be assessed separately for the prop-
erty actually taken and for the damages to property not
taken.
Although no property is taken, consequential damages may
arise from injury to property, such as by a construction of a
public improvement.'
RIGHTS OF TENANTS
The word "owner" should not be construed in any restrict-
ed sense. Ownership of property may be severed. A tenant for
life or a lessee is within the meaning of the term owner. It is
evident that the life tenant or lessee are entitled to recover
compensation for damages or injury sustained by them.
Various jurisdictions have judicially established that les-
sees for years" as well as lessees from year to year are' en-
titled to share in the condemnation award according to their
respective interests. Under North Dakota law all persons
claiming interest in the property, even though not named by
the condemnor, may appear.' The Court may require all par-
ties to be joined. ®
If the lease is entered into after the Condemnation Notice
or Complaint, the lessee is not entitled to share in the com-
pensation since he was not the owner of any estate or interest
when the taking or injury occurred. It is presumed that the
parties to the lease took the injurious effect of the condemna-
tion into consideration when the lease was made and amount
of rent agreed upon.
56. Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1957): King v. Stark
County 67 N.D. 260, 271 N.W. 771 (1:937).
57. Regina v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 2 QBD 151; Pewee Coal Co. v.U. S., 161 F. Supp. 952 (1958); Pasadena v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 257 Pac. 526(1927); Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Bohne, 415 11, 253,113 N.E.2d 319 (1953); Barchellor v. Iowa State Hway. Comm., 251 Ia. 364,
101 N.W.2d 30 (1960).
58. Georgia Power Co. v. Brobks, 207 Ga. 406,- 62 S.E.2d 183 (1950); Far-rell V. Manhatten Ry. Co., 43 App. Div. 143, 59 NYS 401 (1899).
59. N. D. Cent Code § 35-15-20 (1961).
60. N. D. Cent. Code § 35-15-19 (1961).
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RIGHTS OF ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS
Although very little case law exists regarding this problem,
it is generally conceded that, as a matter of interpretation,
when it is expressly provided by law that damage to land from
public improvements shall be paid for, the destruction of an
abutter's peculiar rights in a public way comes within the
scope of such provision. Where access of abutting lands is ob-
structed in North Dakota by a change of grade on the road,
the -owner is entitled to compensation under the "damage"
provision of the Constitution.1 A more recent decision has
stated that it is essential that the property owner show that
permanent improvements were made before the taking, and
that the actual damages resulted from the condemnation.'
WHEN MUST THE PROPERTY OWNER YIELD POSSESSION?
Prior to the 1956 Amendment to Section 14 of the North
Dakota Constitution, the courts generally held that the prop-
erty owner retained title to his property during the process
of appeal.' He did not have to give possession until he was
paid. This placed a burden on the condemning agency, since
often it was a period of a year or more before the issue of
compensation was resolved by the courts. The condemnor
could not touch the property during this time.
The Constitution now provides that the state or any of its
departments, political subdivisions or agencies may take pos-
session of the right of way upon making an offer to purchase
and depositing the amount with the Clerk of the District
Court in the county wherein the right of way is located. This
is commonly known as the "quick take" law previously, dis-
cussed.' However, if a condemning agency attempts to take
possession before it has acquired a legal rights, an owner may
take legal action to stop the entry.
COMPENSATION TO PROPERTY OWNER
It is well settled law in all jurisdictions in the United States
that when private property is taken by eminent domain, the
61. Cummings v. Minot, 67 N.D. 214, 271 N..V. 421 (1931).
62. Keener v. City of Minot, 98 N.W.2d 901 (1959).
63. Kessler v. Thompson, supra, note 6.
64. N. D. Const. § 14.
65. Kuecks v. Cowell, supra, note 16.
[Vol. 38
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owner of the property is constitutionally entitled to compen-
sation." The inhibitory effect of this constitutional provision
is applicable to proceedings initiated by either the state or a
municipal corporation in North Dakota. 7 The right to claim
compensation in North Dakota is not dependent upon the
particular mode of appropriation."
Most states do not ordinarily prescribe the medium by
which compensation should be paid. However, that the com-
pensation must be made in money, is a qualification that has
been determined by all the courts in which the question has
arisen.'
North Dakota holds that private property cannot be taken
for a public use without "just compensation".' Since the term
"just compensation" is not constitutionally defined, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has stated that damages must be as-
certained and assessed pursuant to the provisions of Section
32-15-22 of the North Dakota Century Code.' An award of
damages in a condemnation case will be sustained if it is with-
in the limits of damages testified to by the witnesses. An ex-
ception to the above rule is that if the verdict "so flagrantly
against the weight of evidence that it appears that the jury
was affected by bias or prejudice, the verdict will be set a-
side." The term "value of the property" as used in Section 32-
15-22 of the Code has been defined as market value of the
property.' Market value is construed as:
"...the highest price for which property can be sold in
the open market by a willing seller to a willing purchaser,
neither acting under compulsion and both exercising rea-
sonable judgment."'
Damages have been assessed for many causes in condem-
66. U. S. v. 44 Acres of Land, 121 F. Supp. 862 (1959); Creasy v. Stevens,
160 F. Supp. 404 (1958); Podesta v. Linden Irrigation Dist., 296 P.2d 401 (Cal.
1956); State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1958); Becker County
S.&G. Co. v. Wosick, 62 N.D. 720, 245 N.W. 454 (1932); Equitable Life Ass.
Society v. Lickness, 63 S.D. 618, 262 N.W. 206 (1935).
67. Messer v. Dickinson, 71 N.D. 568, 3 N.W.2d 241 (1942).
68. Donaldson v. Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942).
69. E. g., Schwartz v. City of New London, 20 Conn. Sup. 21, 120 A.2d 84
(1955); Hellen v. Medford, 188 Mass. 42, 73 N.E. .1070 (1905).
70. Williams v. City of Fargo, 63 N.D. 183, 247 N.W. 46 (1933).
71. Little v. Burleigh County, supra, note 56; Minnkota Power Co-op v.
Bacon, 72 N.W.2d 880 (N.D. 1955); Wishek Investment Co. v. McIntosh
County, 77 N.D. 685, 45 N.W.2d 417 (1950); Lineburh v. Sandven, 74 N.D.
364, 21 N.W.2d 808 (1946).
72. Bigelow v. Draper, supra, note 14.
73. Waterman v. Minneapolis, St. Paul By. Co. 26 N.D. 540, 145 N.W. 19
(1914); Carpenter v. Village of Dickey, 26 N.D. 176, at 185, 143 N.W. 964
(1913).
74. Little v. Burleigh County, supra, note 56.
75. Ibid.
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nation proceedings in North Dakota, examples of which are
water drainage ditches," railroad tracks," severance of land
by a highway," power transmission lines' and telephone
lines. ' Damages are not awarded for increased business ex-
pense as a result of property being condemned, although if the
market value of the owner's land is depreciating by condem-
nation, such evidence would become material on that issue
alone.'
EVIDENCE OF VALUE
Expert witnesses are allowed to testify for both the con-
demnor and property owner concerning the issue of value. The
jury may also view the premises; not an absolute right, but
with the discretion of the court.
It has been suggessted that:
only when there is agreement of the parties that
specific comparable sales are both admissable and mater-
ial, would the court be justified in requiring the exchange
of comparable sales list."'
A recent North Dakota District Court case held that the
landowner standing in the position of a seller, may call buyers
to testify with regard to comparable sales. Conversely, the
condemning agency, which stands in the position of the buyer,
may call sellers to testify with regard to comparable sales.
The land owner may not call sellers, nor the condemning
agency buyers to testify. '
It has been suggested that:
it *'experts . . . are not permitted to testify as to the
sale price of a comparable sale on direct examination, al-
though they may be cross-examined as to specific sales
and if the question calls for the price of a comparable
sale, he may state it." '"
The jury may, concerning opinions as to value, weigh the
evidence of experts in the light of their own (the jury's)
76. Ross v. Prante,17 N.D. 266, 115 N.W. 833 (1908).
77. Montana Eastern Ry. Co. v. Lebeck, 32 N.D. 162. 155 N.W. 648 (1915).
78. Olson v. Thompson, 74 N.W.2d 432 (1956); Lineburg v. Sandven,
supra, note 71.
79. Northern States Power Co. v. Effertz, supra, note 32.
80. Otter Tail v. Von Bank, 72 N.D. 497, 8 N.W.2d 599 (1943).
81. Little v. Burleigh County, supra, note 56. The property owner
was transporting farm produce across a muddy ditch.
82. Pederson, Pre-Trial Practices in Condemnation at 10. (Presented at
the American Association of' State Highway Officials Meeting, Detroit,
Michigan, December 2, 1960).
83. Letter from Eugene E. Burdick, District Judge, 5th Judicial District,
November 28, 1961.
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examination of the property. However, the verdict must find
support in some of the evidence presented. The jury cannot
fix the value of the damages above the highest or below the
lowest figure which is fixed by expert evidence, unless other
circumstances proved in the case justify in so doing.' If only
experts testify, the jury is restricted to the highest and lowest
estimate presented."
MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
1. WHO IS PLAINTIFF IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS?-In
some instances, the acquiring agency will be designated as the
respondent and the property owner, the appellantY Section 32-
15-30 of the North Dakota Century Code would indicate that
the condemning agency is definitely the plaintiff. Section 32-
15-20 of the Code denotes the property owner as the defen-
dant. Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on
this question, a 1961 case makes' it evident that the District
Court considers the property owner the defendant, and the
condemnor the plaintiff. Other cases have a like rationale.'
2. DOES ACQUIRING AGENCY HAVE A RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL?
Forty-two states do have specific constitutional provisions re-
quiring that the value of property taken by eminent domain
be ascertained by a jury.' The language in Section 14 of the
North Dakota Constitution and Section 24-01-22 of the Cen-
tury Code is not entirely clear on the point of the right of the
acquiring agency to a jury trial. District Courts have general-
ly ruled that the acquiring agency has a right to jury trial if
the acquiring agency asks for a jury trial pursuant to an
existing statute. It has been suggested that:
"... the plaintiff wherein may apply to the judge of
the district court where the same is pending for an order
requiring a jury to be summoned to assess the damages
in such action."'1
Section 32-15-01 also provides:
"... Such compensation in all cases shall be ascertain-
ed by a jury, unless a jury is waived."
84. Ibid. (Emphasis is that of Judge Burdick).
85. Bigelow v. Draper, supra, note 15.
86. Ibid.
87. Cowl v. Wentz, 107 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1961).
88. Wentz v. Pletka, 108 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1961).
89. E. g. Ottertail Power Co. v. Von Bank, supra, note 80.
90. NICHOLS, op. cit., vol. 1 at 355, see note 24.
91. Letter from Eugene E. Burdick, District Judge, 5th Judicial District,
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It is apparent that both the property owner and condemnor
have the right to a jury trial, and such right must be waived
by both before the court will decide the issue of compensation.
3. ON WHAT DATES ARE DAMAGES TO BE AsSESSED?-The
North Dakota Century Code deals specifically with the ques-
tion of the time at which the right to damages accrues.
". *'For the purpose of assessing compensation and
damages the right thereto shall be deemed to have accru-
ed at the date of the trial and its actual value at that date
shall be the measure of compensation for all property
actually taken . . ."
Various North Dakota cases have held in accordance with
the statute that the date of trial is the date of assessment.3
Nine states in addition to North Dakota have general con-
demnation statutes that fix the date of valuation.' In some
states, the filing of the petition or the Notice to Condemn, the
primary step in land condemnation, marks the point of time
at which it appears to be fair and just to both parties to fix
the value of the property. Seventeen jurisdictions have held
that damages should be assessed either as of the date of the
trial or of the award of the commissioners.
One North Dakota case held that payment is legally due to
the owner as of the date of taking or damaging the property.'
This problem is most coeval in North Dakota in light of a
greatly expanded highway program. In some instances, the
Highway Department will have possession of property for two
years or more prior to the date of the condemnation trial. The
Highway Department asserts that it would be inconsistent to
use a different date for valuing the property than the date of
acquiring it." They claim that since the adoption of the
Amendment of Section 14 of. the Constitution, Section 32-15-
23 is no longer applicable to highway condemnation. This ap-
pears to be an issue peculiar to North Dakota, and, it is one
that has not been ruled upon by the North Dakota Supreme
Court. District Courts apparently have decided this problem
in both the affirmative and negative.
December 4, 1961.
92. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-23 (1961).
93. Montana Eastern Ry. Co. v. Lebeck, supra, note 77; Tri-State
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Cosgriff, 19 N.D. 771, 124 N.W. 75 (1909).
94. Other states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah.
95. Donaldson v. Bismarck, supra, note 68.
96. Supra, note 35.
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4. INTEREST-Generally, there is a right to interest on the
amount awarded as of the time that payment was due until it
was actually made. Payment may be postponed for various
reasons, the most common of which is pending appeal. A num-
ber of jurisdictions, including North Dakota, say that the
right to interest does not depend upon statutory authoriza-
tion or upon special agreement.
North Dakota has held that the owner of property taken or
damaged by a condemnor is entitled to interest on the amount
of compensation awarded from the time when property was
taken or damaged." If the property owner is awarded a larger
sum than that deposited, he is usually entitled to interest on
the increased sum." However, if the property owner is award-
ed less upon appeal, he is not entitled to interest for the period
of delay occasioned by such appeal."
5. WHAT TITLE DOES THE CONDEMNING BODY ACQUIRE AND
ON WHAT DATE?-The North Dakota Case of Kessler v.
Thompson"5 held that the property owner retained title and
apparent control over the property which the condemnor is
attempting to acquire during the appeal. It stated that the
condemning agency may not take or damage the property be-
fore the court determined the rights of the property owner.
This case was reviewed under Section 14 of the North Dakota
Constitution prior to its 1956 Amendments."0 Section 14, now,
as amended, provides that when the state or any of its de-
partments, agencies or political subdivisions seek to acquire a
right of way, it may take possession upon making an offer to
purchase. It must thereafter deposit the amount of such offer
with the Clerk of District Court in the county in which the
land is located. The Clerk then immediately notifies the owner
of such deposit, and he may appeal in the manner provided.
A 1959 decision under amended Section 14 of the Constitu-
97. Lineburg v. Sndven, supra, note 71; Donaldson v. Bismarck, supra,
note 68.
98. Central Neb. P.P.&.I. Dist. v. Fairchild, 126 F.2d 302 (1942); Schnull
v. Indianapolis Union R. Co., 190 Ind. 572, 131 N.E. 51 (1921); St. Louis
Housing Authority v. Magafas, 324 S.W.2d 697 (Miss. 195'9).
99. Feltz v. Central Nebr. P.P.&.. Dist., 124 F.2d 578 (1942).
100. 75 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 1956).
101. N. D. Const. § 14, before 1956:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation having been first made to, or paid into court for the
owner, and no right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any cor-
poration, other than municipal, until full compensation therefor be first
made in money or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespec-
tive of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation,
which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waiv-
ed."
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tion held that the condemning agency could take possession
upon making an offer to purchase, and following the prescrib-
ed procedure." - This right appears to be limited to the state
or any of its political subdivisions, departments or agencies.
The general rule is that only such an estate in the property
sought to be acquired by eminent domain may be taken as is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
for which the proceedings are brought." North Dakota has a
statute classifying the estates in land condemned for public
use."M The Supreme Court, in attempting to resolve this prob-
lem, held in an action to quiet title to oil, gas, and other min-
erals on land condemned by the Highway Department before
1953, that the title acquired by the Highway Department was
more than an easement.'0 3 They stated, however, that it was
not a fee simple absolute, but a limited or determinable fee.
They concluded that:
It *'The title acquired by the State was subject to re-
verter when such land, or part thereof, or rights in land
were no longer needed for highway purposes . . ."
The State, as owner of this determinable fee, could now
vacate any land or part thereof which had been taken and re-
vest the title or rights so vested in the persons, their heirs,
successors or assigns in whom it was vested at the time of
taking."' Generally, the State has the right to execute non-
operating oil and gas leases so long as the estate of the State,
which it acquired under the condemnation proceedings, con-
tinued.
In 1953, the legislature, recognizing this situation, amend-
ed two statutes, reserving the "oil, gas or fluid minerals" to
the property owners in condemnation proceedings."
FEDERAL CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
A brief discussion is proper regarding the procedures relat-
ing to condemnation of property by the federal government.
Between 1956 and 1961, there were 369 condemnation cases in
the United States District Court in the District of North Da-
102. Kuecks v. Cowell, supra, note 36.
103. Wallentinson v. Williams County, supra, note 25.
104. N. D. Cent. Code § 32-15-03 (1961).
105. Wallentinson v. Williams County, supra, note 25.
106. Ibid.
107. Supra, note 27.
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kota."' It is quite apparent that federal condemnation, partic-
ularly in the area of water resource programs," and military
defense installations ' will cause even greater programs of
federal condemnation in North Dakota in the near future.
Although the United States has for many years employed
its powers of eminent domain to condemn land for federal
purposes,"' it was not until 1951 that a particular rule govern-
ing the procedure for federal condemnation of land was prom-
ulgated as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' This
rule is Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
113
Apparently the delay in formulating Rule 71A" was not one
of neglect, but a result of the diversity of opinion relating to
all aspects of such a prospective rule. The rule as adopted pre-
sents a compromise of various conflicting views pertaining to
federal procedures in property condemnation cases. The gen-
eral procedure adhered to in United States condemnation pro-
ceedings prior to the promulagation of Rule 71A was in ac-
cordance with the provisions of a general conformity statute
which provided that the federal procedure should conform
with the existing procedure in the particular state jurisdiction
in which the property was located."' Thus prior to the adop-
tion of Rule 71A each federal department and agency form-
ulated its own particularized rules pertaining to the methodo-
logy of condemnation of property.
One of the difficulties apparently encountered in drafting
Rule 71A, was the disparity in the laws of the various states
pertaining to the methods followed by the various jurisdic-
tions, the prime conflict was between the use of court appoint-
ed appraisers, charged with the duty of establishing the value
108. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
U. S. Courts, United States Printing Office:
1956- 16 Cases-Table C3-p. 218
1957-130 Cases-Table Ce-p. 178
1958-127 Cases-Table C3-p. 166
1959- 59 Cases-Table C3-p. 190
1960-101 Cases-Table C3-p. 238.
109. See Message of John F. Kennedy to Congress on Economic Recovery
and Growth. HL Doc. No. 81, 87th Congress, 1st Session; particularly the
statement:
Our water resource program, including flood control, irrigation, navigation,
watershed development, water pollution control-require priority attention.
110. Particularly the growth of Minot and Grand Forks Air Force Bases
and the establishment of proposed Minuteman Missile sites.
111. See Kohl v. U. S., 91 U.S. 367 (1875), Chappell v. U. S., 160 U.S. 499
(1896).
112. Pp. 3, U. S. Supreme Ct. Order (April 30, 1951), transmitted to Con-
gress (H. R. Doc. 121, 82nd Cong., 1st Session. (1951). This section became
effective on August 1, 1951.
113. Ibid.
114. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in 1938.
115. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, U. S. Supreme Court, 28
U. S. C. § 32072 (1952) at 4355-62.
116. 25 State 357 (1888).
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of the property and the determination of the property's value
by a jury in an actual judicial proceeding.'
Rule 71A was a compromise between the two existing points
of state view by its providing both the appraiser concept and
the jury concepts as a means of ascertaining the value of the
property taken."' If Congress does not set up separate tribun-
als as it may,"9 either party may under Rule 71A file a de-
mand for a jury trial.
The court may deny a jury demand and appoint a commis-
sioner to determine the value of the award. A number of cases
have arisen regarding the actual discretion reposing with the
Court to deny a jury determination of damages.
It has been held that while a choice between a jury and a
commission is within the proper purview of the trial court, it
is possible that the use of a commission may unnecessarily
prolong the proceedings and increase the expense."n Where the
land being condemned is of exceptional location, quantity, or
of unusual or complex character, the court may refuse a jury
valuation and appoint commissioners in order to obtain the
most fair valuation of the property."-'
It has been stated that where a court acted with the desire
"to remove all obstacles that caused delay, and bring this ac-
tion to a conclusion" as the only reason for the appointment
of a commission, it was in effect an abuse of discretion to deny
117. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, supra, note 4, at 4353.
118. "Trial. If the action involves the exercise of the power of eminent
domain under the law of the United States, any tribunal specially constitut-
ed by an Act of Congress governing the case for the trial of the issue of
just compensation shall be the tribunal for the determination of that issue;
but if there is no such specially constituted tribunal, any party may have
a trial by jury of the issue of just compensation by filing a demand there-
fore within the time allowed for answer or within further time as the court
may fix, unless the court in its discretion orders that, because of the char-
acter, location, or quantity of the property to be condemned, or for other
reasons in the interest of justice, the issue of compensation shall be deter-
mined by a commission of three persons appointed by it. If a commission
is appointed, it shall have the powers of a master provided in subdivision.
(c) of Rule 53 and proceedings before it shall be governed by the provis-
ions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (d) of Rule 53. Its action and
report shall have the effect, and be dealt with by the court in accordance
with the practice, prescribed in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Rule
53. Trial of all issues shall otherwise be by the court." 71A h, F.R.C.P.
119. "By the Constitution of the United States, the estimate of the just
compensation for property taken for the public use, under the right of the
eminent domain, is not required to be made by a jury, but may be entrust-
ed by Congress to commissioners appointed by a court or by the executive,
or to an inquest consisting of more or fewer more than an ordinary trial."
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 (1897).
120. U. S. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. C. 264 F.2d 112 (C.A.3rd 1959).
121. Ibid; see also U.S. v. Certain Tracts of Land in City of Richmond
Contra Costa CoUnty, State of California, 21 F. R. D. 389 (D.C. Cal. 1958).
U. S. v. 5,677.94 Acres of Land, More or Less, of Crow Reservation, State of
Montana, 162 F. Supp. 108 (D.C. Mont. 1958). An Accord case where a state
proceeding was similar to the federal proceeding is Port of New York
Authority v. Heming, 167 A.2d 609 (1961).
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a jury.'" However, the same Circuit Court of Appeals refused
in United States v. Waymire'" to disallow a United States dis-
trict court holding which had appointed a commission at the
request of the property owners despite a demand for a jury
trial by the government. It is interesting to note that in the
Waymire case, it was the government and not the individual
demanding a jury trial.
It appears that the current trend of cases may indicate that
the federal courts will grant the right to trial by jury except
in complex cases wherein are involved numerous parcels of
land in varied locations with diverse ownership.
Judge John Paul has stated that "trying the issues of valua-
tion before a jury is a cumbersome and inefficient proceed-
ing, wasteful of time and expense, and in many instances,
particularly where properties of small values are involved, re-
sulting in hardship and injustice to property owners."2
Opposed to the Paul position is the viewpoint that the com-
missioner method is costly, cumbersome, and lengthy." Thus
here exist varying viewpoints regarding the efficiency of both
the jury and the commission methods of determining property
values. It would appear that that current rationale of deci-
sions is one of permitting jury trials to be used unless the
proceedings are of unusual or complex character.
It is interesting to note that in Great Britain the former
rule provided three methods of determining the value of con-
demned lands. These were the use of justices of the peace, by
arbitration, or by a sheriff's jury." The current procedure,
however, is to use a Lands Tribunal' which is most analgous
to our commission method of determining value. This Lands
Tribunal is generally composed of both lawyers and survey-
ors.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE
Under the provisions of Rule 71A (c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, an action is commenced by the filing of a
complaint. The complaint states: 1) the use for which the
122. U. S. v. Theimer, 199 F.2d 501 (CAA 10th Cir. 1952).
123. 202 F.2d 550 (CCA 10th Cir. 1953).
124. Paul, Condemnation Procedure Under Federal Rule 71A, 43 Ia. L.
Rev. 231, 1958.
125. See, Dolan, Federal Condemnation Practice; General Aspects, Ap-
praisal Journal (Jan. 1959) at 15; see also Dolan, New Federal Procedure in
Condemnation Actions, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1071 (1953).
126. Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vic. c. 18) at 21.
127. Lands Tribunal Act. 1949 (12, 13, 14 Geo. 6 C.42) at 3.
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property is to be taken, 2) the authority by which the prop-
erty is to be taken, 3) a short description of the property suf-
ficient for identification, 4) the particular interest sought to
be acquired, and 5) the names of the defendants as the de-
signated owners of the property sought to be taken. A require-
ment exists that at the commencement of the action, only the
known defendants are required to be joined. If the property
records indicate any additional possible defendants, they must
also be joined in the action. If the records fail to identify pos-
sible owners or claimants of interests, they can be joined as
"unknown owners. ' 1
After the complaint is filed, the condemning government
agency must deliver to the clerk of the court notices to be di-
rected to the named defendants and notice must also be given
to any defendants subsequently named." The notice advises
each defendant that he may file an answer within twenty days
after service of the notice and that failure to answer consti-
tutes a consent to the taking and to the authority of the court
to proceed to hear the action and determine the proper com-
pensation.'" The notice states that the defendant may file an
answer within twenty days after service of the notice and that
failure to answer constitutes a consent to the taking and to
the authority of the court to hear the action and to fix the
compensation. However, the defendant need not file or serve
a claim or answer to preserve his right of notice and his op-
portunity to state his position in the trial regarding the com-
pensation to be paid for the taking of his property."
The notice may be served, as the circumstances demand,
either in person on the defendant or by publication."' Any time
before the trial on the issue of the compensation to be paid,
the complaint may be amended at the option of the plaintiff,
without the permission of the court. However, no amendment
is permitted which would result in a dismissal of the action
after title or possession has been acquired or taken."
One of the most difficult tasks for the Advisory Committee
128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A (c) (2).
129. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A (d) (1). See also U. S. v. 758.72 Acres of Land in
Boone and Carroll Counties, Arkansas (W.D. Ark. 1959); 2 FR Serv. 2d 60b.
21 Case 2 wherein the court held that relief could not be granted under
Rule 60 (b) where record mortgageholders were not made parties.
130. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A (d) (2).
131. Ibid.
132. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A (d) (3). The provisions for publication are within
the due process clause as defined in Mullance v. Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
133. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71 (a) (f) See Also U. S. v. Certain Interests in Pro-
perty in Cascade County, Montana, 163 F. Supp. 518 (D.C. Mont. 1958).
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on Rules was the resolving of the various methods of the trial
and the ascertainment of the value of the property sought to
be condemned. "Frequently the trial was conducted at a place
remote from the location of the property. The acquisition by
condemnation of large areas for military and related projects
required and necessitated the taking of many parcels or tracts
in different ownerships and presenting many dissimilar phy-
sical characteristics. In many instances several actions were
instituted involving groups of parcels or a single action which
consolidated all of the tracts to be acquired. Frequently, title
or possession vested on different dates, with considerable time
intervals, thus presenting different dates of valuation and
varying and conflicting factors affecting valuation ....' These
are some of the factors which were determinative in the adop-
tion of both the jury and the commission method of ascertain-
ing damages as previously discussed.
The trial by the use of a commission is analgous to the trial
by a Master under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. While the finding of the commission is advisory in na-
ture, the court will not disturb its findings where it is proper-
ly based upon evidence unless these findings are clearly erron-
eous."
Rule 71A makes no specific provision for the viewing of the
property by a commission or a jury, but allows the court to
determine this within its own discretion.' Many states have
statutes which make mandatory a view of condemned prop-
erty by the judicial agency which will fix compensation. Nor-
mally inspection of the property would prove to be of posi-
tive assistance in determining adequate and fair compensa-
tion." Rule 71A does not specifically provide that the com-
mission, jury or court determining the compensation in a par-
ticular case must mandatorily view the condemned premises,
but apparently allows the problem of viewing to be determin-
ed by the sound discretion of the court."
Rule 71A provides that the action may be dismissed in
three ways. It may be dismissed as of right without an order
of the court by filing prior to a hearing, a notice of dismissal
134. Dolan, New Federal Procedure in Condemnation Actions, 39 Va. L.
Rev. 1071 (1953).
135. U. S. v. Waymirs, 202 F.2d 550 (1953) cf. U. S. v. Buhler, 254 F.2d &
876 (1958).
136. Webb v. U. S., 256 F.2d 669, Cert. den. 356 U.S. 918 (1958).
137. Ibid.
138. See Woodland Cemetery Co. v. IT. S., 110 F. Supp. 704 (1953).
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in which the property is described. " A second way the pro-
ceeding may be dismissed is by the affected parties filing a
stipulation dismissing the action order of the court, before a
judgment has been rendered which vests title or possession in
the government." Thirdly, a proceeding may be dismissed by
court order any time before compensation is determined and
paid, if title to and possession of the property has not been
assumed by the United States.'
No provision is made in Rule 71A requiring the plaintiff to
deposit any amount as part of the estimated compensation as
a condition precedent to an action of condemnation. Only if a
specific act or statute requires such a deposit, must a deposit
be made. If possession is taken prior to the vesting of title,
compensation under Rule 71A is determined as of the date of
the taking of possession rather than of the date of vesting of
title. It must be noted that Rule 71A does not supercede the
Declaration of Taking Act."
Under Rule 71A only one judgment is contemplated, that
judgment determining the actual compensation to be paid by
the plaintiff for the property condemned. Costs in condemna-
tion actions are not allowed to the prevailing party under the
provisions of Rule 54 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure." The theory is that the federal government is nor-
mally the prevailing party and it would be inequitable to per-
mit its costs to be taxed against the property owner.
Mention should be made of the fact that the vast majority
of condemnation cases in federal courts are based upon an
exercise of the federal power of eminent domain. A few cases
do occur in federal courts where the exercise of the power of
eminent domain of a state is involved under the diversity of
citizenship concept. These cases may be governed by federal
procedure, but the Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Rule prevails
and the state laws affecting substantive rights must be given
full faith and credit."
References should be made to Section 1033 (g) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code as created by the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958.' This section dealing with involuntary conver-
139. Fed. 1a Civ. P 71a (1) (1).
140. Fed. FL Civ. P 71A (1) (2).
141. Fed. R. Civ. P 71A (i) (3).
142. 40 U. S. C. §§258A-258E.
143. Fed. R. Civ. P 71A (1).
144. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
145. Fed. R. Civ. p. 71A (k).
146.' 72 Stat. 1606 (1958), 26 U. S. C. § 1033 (Supp. 1959).
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sion of property states:
Condemnation of Real Property held for Productive Usa
in Trade or Business or for Investment:
(1) Special rule. For purposes of subsection (a), if
real property (not including stock in trade or other prop-
erty held primarily for sale) held for productive use in
trade or business or for investment is (as the result of its
seizure, requisition, or condemnation, or threat or im-
minence thereof) compulsorily or involuntarily convert-
ed, property of a like kind to be held either for productive
use in trade or business or for investment shall be treated
as property similar or related in service or use to the
property so converted.
(2) Limitations- (A) Purchase of stock. Paragraph
(1) shall not apply to the purchase of stock in the ac-
quisition of control of a corporation described in subsec-
tions (a) (3) (A). (B) Conversions before January 1,
1958. Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to the com-
pulsory or involuntary conversion of any real property
only if the disposition of the converted property (within
the meaning of subsection (a) (2) occurs after December
31, 1957.2
It appears that under the "like kind" test of 1033 (g) real
property held for productive uses or as an investment or
homes which are condemned and replaced within the prescrib-
ed period with real property held for the same purpose are
within the purview of the "like kind" test as set forth in 1033
(g).
CONCLUSION
The material presented in this article relates to many of the
problems and procedures of land condemnation. While all pos-
sible procedures are not delineated nor all problems fully dis-
cussed, the major problems and procedures (both state and
federal) relating to land condemnation in North Dakota are
presented. As has been earlier stated, the legal profession
must be properly informed if it is to perform its proper func-
tion in devising solutions for the diverse problems arising
from eminent domain and land condemnation. This is the
hopeful intent of this article.
147. Ibid.
1962]
